

Rodrigo Yañez Naudon

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Citizenship: Chile (F-1 visa)

REFERENCES

Lones Smith (Advisor) Professor Department of Economics UW–Madison lones.smith@wisc.edu	Benjamin Bernard Assistant Professor Department of Economics UW–Madison bbernard3@wisc.edu	Daniel Quint Professor Department of Economics UW–Madison dquint@ssc.wisc.edu
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EDUCATION

University of Wisconsin–Madison <i>Ph.D. in Economics</i> . Advisor: Lones Smith	May 2027 (expected)
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile <i>M.Sc. in Economics</i>	2016
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso <i>B.A. in Business and Economics</i>	2012

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory, Dynamic Games, Information Economics, Industrial Organization

JOB MARKET PAPER

Dangerous Talk

I study a continuous-time stopping game between two partners who gradually learn each other's private type—normative or rogue—from exogenous public signals. A partner's type is irrelevant to joint output but determines incentives at termination: either partner may quit, normative partners may call out suspected rogues, and rogue partners may scheme with suspected accomplices. Stopping opportunities arrive privately, making the partnership's survival an endogenous source of information. When opportunities are sufficiently infrequent, the game admits a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, in which normative partners are called out with positive probability. A one-sided learning benchmark links the costs of mistaken accusations to the ordering of quitting and call-out thresholds. In an intermediate regime, false accusations account for most dissolutions involving normative partners, while rogue partners are more likely to quit than to be exposed.

PUBLICATIONS

An Inexpert Expert (with Jose A. Carrasco and Martin Carrasco)
Applied Economics Letters, 30(18): 2613–2618, 2023.

Sequential Search and Firm Prominence (with Jose A. Carrasco)
Economic Theory, 74(1): 209–233, 2022.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Silent Majorities

I study a dynamic model of self-censorship in which agents learn the social consensus only from voiced opinions. Because silence goes unobserved, learning is biased toward those who speak, giving rise to silent majorities.

Why Sell Loot Boxes? (with T. Fung Ngai)

A monopolist sells an indivisible good to risk-averse consumers with unit demand who share a common valuation but differ in wealth. By selling a lottery that delivers the good stochastically, the firm effectively makes the good divisible. When consumers can purchase the lottery repeatedly, they optimally choose their number of attempts and hence their overall probability of receiving the good. Richer consumers choose more attempts, so the repeated lottery screens consumers by wealth and can generate more revenue than does a posted price. This repeated lottery is nevertheless dominated by a menu of one-shot lotteries. We show that selling bundles of a virtual currency that consumers then spend on lotteries closes the gap, rationalizing why this selling scheme is prevalent in video games.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, University of Wisconsin–Madison

ECON 713: PhD Microeconomic Theory (first-year core)	Spring 2023, 2024, 2025
ECON 711: PhD Microeconomic Theory (first-year core)	Fall 2022
ECON 708: Microeconomics II (Master's)	Spring 2022
ECON 701: Microeconomics I (Master's)	Fall 2021, 2023, 2024

Instructor of Record, Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María, Chile

Microeconomics II (undergraduate)	2017–2019
Economics 1A (undergraduate)	2018–2019

Section Instructor, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Chile

Principles of Economics (undergraduate)	2018
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Junior Consultant, Harrison y Johnson Asociados, Chile	2016–2019
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Projects included:

- *Pricing design*: stock-market interconnection.
- *Institutional design*: competition-monitoring unit for the national electricity system operator.
- *Competition assessment*: interchange fees for instant fund transfers in banking.

HONORS, FELLOWSHIPS & AWARDS

JPGI Teaching Assistant Scholarship, UW–Madison Economics	2022–23
JPGI Summer Fellowship, UW–Madison Economics	2021–22, 2022–23

LANGUAGES

Spanish (native), English (fluent)